12 ideas
| 21960 | Ordinary language is the beginning of philosophy, but there is much more to it [Austin,JL] |
| 10835 | True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion [Austin,JL] |
| 10836 | Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map [Austin,JL] |
| 10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
| 10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
| 10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
| 21598 | Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson] |
| 14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
| 14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
| 14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
| 14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
| 14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |