11 ideas
| 1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
| 10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
| 10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
| 10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| 16700 | In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff] |
| 16701 | To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff] |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| 16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |