12 ideas
| 18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
| 10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
| 10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
| 22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
| 21507 | Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel] |
| 6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
| 17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
| 13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
| 6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
| 18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 18006 | Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor] |