14 ideas
| 18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
| 18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
| 10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
| 18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
| 18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
| 18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
| 10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
| 10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
| 18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
| 13127 | Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff] |
| 18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
| 15194 | Time, as it appears in standard modern science, is bad verificationist metaphysics [Smith,Q, by Le Poidevin] |