Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Bernays, Vann McGee and John Dupr

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28 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10304 Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
18755 Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18751 Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
18761 Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18753 An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18754 Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
18757 Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
18760 The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10303 Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10306 Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
17377 All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
17376 We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
17390 Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
17374 The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17378 Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
18762 A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17381 Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
17385 Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
17375 Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
17379 Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
17384 Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
17387 Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
17382 Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
17380 Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17383 Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
17386 The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]