Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Bernays, William K. Clifford and Karen Bennett

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10304 Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10303 Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10306 Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
16039 Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K]
16043 Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
16047 Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16040 Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K]
16044 Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K]
16046 Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16049 Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
16042 The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
6587 It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]