23 ideas
| 9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
| 6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
| 9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
| 9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
| 9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
| 9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
| 9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
| 7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
| 7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
| 7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
| 7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
| 7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
| 7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
| 9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
| 5880 | Xenocrates held that the soul had no form or substance, but was number [Xenocrates, by Cicero] |
| 7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
| 9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
| 9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |