Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Boghossian, Democritus (attrib) and Jeff McMahan

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61 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)]
Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)]
A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)]
Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)]
Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)]
Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan]
You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan]
Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan]
Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan]
The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan]
A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan]
Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan]
Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan]
The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan]
If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan]
If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan]
Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan]
If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan]
If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan]
Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan]
Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan]
Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan]