67 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
8210 | Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida] |
8211 | The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida] |
6840 | Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley] |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
8216 | Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida] |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
8213 | I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida] |
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
9921 | 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen] |
6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
9924 | Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen] |
9933 | The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen] |
9928 | Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen] |
9926 | A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen] |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
9932 | The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen] |
9923 | We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen] |
9925 | Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen] |
9934 | Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen] |
9918 | Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen] |
9929 | Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen] |
9927 | Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen] |
9930 | Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
9919 | The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen] |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
21932 | 'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
8212 | Everything that is experienced in consciousness is meaning [Derrida] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
21929 | Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida] |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
21936 | A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21937 | Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
9922 | If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen] |