380 ideas
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
16395 | Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker] |
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
17034 | Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke] |
11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
4955 | Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke] |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
15327 | Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten] |
15343 | Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten] |
14967 | Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta] |
14966 | The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta] |
16328 | Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach] |
6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
10163 | Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman] |
10559 | Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta] |
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
10760 | With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg] |
9560 | S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense [Fine,K] |
16189 | The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen] |
15132 | The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson] |
14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
12220 | Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K] |
11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
10437 | Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4949 | Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
4951 | A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke] |
17031 | A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke] |
9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
8957 | Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó] |
10428 | Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4959 | A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke] |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
10792 | The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
12222 | Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K] |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
9224 | Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K] |
9222 | The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K] |
9223 | My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K] |
12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
14262 | Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
14896 | Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
14217 | The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K] |
14216 | The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K] |
14218 | A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K] |
14220 | Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K] |
14219 | Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K] |
16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
17000 | We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke] |
17647 | Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam] |
15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
16995 | Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke] |
17047 | If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke] |
11868 | A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
5450 | For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner] |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
17055 | Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke] |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
16997 | An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke] |
17045 | De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke] |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
17030 | Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke] |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
16955 | Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett] |
16996 | Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke] |
13971 | Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames] |
12100 | An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt] |
16991 | No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke] |
12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
11867 | If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins] |
12018 | Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G] |
17046 | Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke] |
8274 | Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
17044 | A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke] |
15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
17038 | If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke] |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
17036 | Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke] |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
11880 | Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
4797 | Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos] |
17058 | What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke] |
4970 | What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke] |
17037 | Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke] |
15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
17059 | Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke] |
9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
4728 | Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady] |
16990 | A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke] |
9386 | The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke] |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
2408 | Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers] |
4960 | "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke] |
4966 | Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke] |
9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
13967 | Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke] |
13970 | Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
4950 | Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke] |
9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
16992 | Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
16993 | If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke] |
16998 | Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke] |
17001 | A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke] |
4952 | Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke] |
7761 | Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan] |
7693 | Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette] |
9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
17003 | Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke] |
5821 | Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam] |
14068 | If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke] |
10436 | A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4953 | We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke] |
4961 | It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke] |
9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
9221 | The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider] |
16986 | That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke] |
8259 | Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe] |
16989 | Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke] |
4947 | A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
17052 | The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke] |
13975 | Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames] |
17048 | Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
4948 | Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
4958 | Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
4969 | I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke] |
9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
7430 | Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke] |
7867 | If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau] |
3228 | Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey] |
5832 | Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP] |
4968 | Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke] |
9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
7305 | Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A] |
19270 | If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke] |
16394 | Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke] |
17874 | Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke] |
5822 | The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke] |
17033 | We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke] |
4689 | Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn] |
17504 | Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam] |
17035 | We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke] |
4956 | A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke] |
16988 | Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG] |
17029 | It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke] |
17032 | Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke] |
15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
14893 | Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
11075 | The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
4963 | The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke] |
17056 | Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke] |
17053 | Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke] |
4964 | 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke] |
6765 | Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird] |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
9387 | The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke] |
17054 | Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke] |
17057 | Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
4965 | Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke] |
15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
17050 | Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke] |
17049 | 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke] |
17051 | The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke] |