Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Horwich, A.E. Taylor and Richard Dedekind

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52 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 9. Recursive Definition
Dedekind proved definition by recursion, and thus proved the basic laws of arithmetic [Dedekind, by Potter]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
An infinite set maps into its own proper subset [Dedekind, by Reck/Price]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
We have the idea of self, and an idea of that idea, and so on, so infinite ideas are available [Dedekind, by Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Dedekind originally thought more in terms of mereology than of sets [Dedekind, by Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are free creations of the human mind, to understand differences [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Dedekind defined the integers, rationals and reals in terms of just the natural numbers [Dedekind, by George/Velleman]
Ordinals can define cardinals, as the smallest ordinal that maps the set [Dedekind, by Heck]
Order, not quantity, is central to defining numbers [Dedekind, by Monk]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Dedekind's ordinals are just members of any progression whatever [Dedekind, by Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
We want the essence of continuity, by showing its origin in arithmetic [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
A cut between rational numbers creates and defines an irrational number [Dedekind]
Dedekind's axiom that his Cut must be filled has the advantages of theft over honest toil [Dedekind, by Russell]
Dedekind says each cut matches a real; logicists say the cuts are the reals [Dedekind, by Bostock]
I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
In counting we see the human ability to relate, correspond and represent [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Arithmetic is just the consequence of counting, which is the successor operation [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / b. Mark of the infinite
A system S is said to be infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
If x changes by less and less, it must approach a limit [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Dedekind gives a base number which isn't a successor, then adds successors and induction [Dedekind, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Zero is a member, and all successors; numbers are the intersection of sets satisfying this [Dedekind, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Categoricity implies that Dedekind has characterised the numbers, because it has one domain [Rumfitt on Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Induction is proved in Dedekind, an axiom in Peano; the latter seems simpler and clearer [Dedekind, by Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Dedekind originated the structuralist conception of mathematics [Dedekind, by MacBride]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Dedekindian abstraction talks of 'positions', where Cantorian abstraction talks of similar objects [Dedekind, by Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
A thing is completely determined by all that can be thought concerning it [Dedekind]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Dedekind said numbers were abstracted from systems of objects, leaving only their position [Dedekind, by Dummett]
We derive the natural numbers, by neglecting everything of a system except distinctness and order [Dedekind]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Dedekind has a conception of abstraction which is not psychologistic [Dedekind, by Tait]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Religious experience deserves the same respect as our other key experiences, and is best called 'holy' [Taylor,AE, by PG]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]