37 ideas
1597 | Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
8431 | Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich] |
3013 | Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |
23429 | The environment needs localised politics, with its care for the land [Dobson] |
23424 | An ideology judges things now, and offers an ideal, with a strategy for reaching it [Dobson] |
23426 | Ecologism is often non-liberal, by claiming to know other people's best interests [Dobson] |
23427 | Socialism can be productive and centralised, or less productive and decentralised [Dobson] |
23428 | Difference feminists say women differ fundamentally from men [Dobson] |
23422 | For the environment, affluence and technology matter as much as population size [Dobson] |
23425 | Ecologism says growth must be reduced, and efficiency is not enough [Dobson] |
23430 | A million years is a proper unit of political time [Dobson] |
23423 | We currently value the present fourteen times more highly than the future [Dobson] |
1494 | Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle] |
8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich] |
1713 | Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle] |
1742 | Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |