Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Horwich, Ian McFetridge and Stephen Davies

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59 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S]
Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S]
'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S]
It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S]
We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S]
Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S]
The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S]
Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S]
It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S]
A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S]
Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]