107 ideas
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
| 15390 | Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles [Simons] |
| 12865 | Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons] |
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
| 6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
| 6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
| 6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
| 6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
| 6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
| 23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
| 6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
| 12815 | Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons] |
| 12832 | Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons] |
| 12834 | Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons] |
| 12819 | A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons] |
| 12822 | Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons] |
| 12824 | Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons] |
| 12827 | Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons] |
| 12823 | Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons] |
| 12825 | Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons] |
| 12826 | Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons] |
| 12828 | General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12829 | General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12830 | Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons] |
| 12831 | Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons] |
| 12844 | Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons] |
| 12813 | Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons] |
| 12821 | The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons] |
| 18847 | Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons] |
| 12816 | Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons] |
| 12846 | A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons] |
| 12848 | The same members may form two groups [Simons] |
| 12861 | 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons] |
| 6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
| 12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
| 12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
| 12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
| 12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
| 12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
| 12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
| 8979 | Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons] |
| 8981 | Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons] |
| 12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
| 12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
| 12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
| 12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
| 12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
| 8973 | Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons] |
| 12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
| 12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
| 12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
| 12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
| 12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
| 12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
| 12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
| 18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
| 12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
| 12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
| 12886 | A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons] |
| 12857 | Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons] |
| 12835 | Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons] |
| 12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |
| 12866 | Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons] |
| 12867 | A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons] |
| 12864 | We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons] |
| 12814 | Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons] |
| 12817 | 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons] |
| 12833 | If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons] |
| 12849 | Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons] |
| 12877 | Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons] |
| 12888 | The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons] |
| 12871 | Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons] |
| 12870 | We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons] |
| 12873 | Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons] |
| 12874 | An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons] |
| 12837 | Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons] |
| 12856 | Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons] |
| 12885 | Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons] |
| 12854 | An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons] |
| 12855 | The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons] |
| 12872 | The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons] |
| 8431 | Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich] |
| 12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
| 9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
| 9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
| 2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
| 9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
| 9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
| 9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
| 9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
| 18883 | Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons] |
| 18884 | Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons] |
| 6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
| 6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
| 6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |
| 12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
| 12875 | One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons] |
| 8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |