63 ideas
16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
5438 | Hermeneutics of tradition is sympathetic, hermeneutics of suspicion is hostile [Ricoeur, by Mautner] |
20981 | What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen] |
20982 | In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen] |
16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
20990 | Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen] |
21005 | A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen] |
20983 | The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen] |
20987 | The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen] |
20984 | A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen] |
20986 | A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen] |
21001 | Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen] |
21002 | Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen] |
20999 | Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen] |
20979 | Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen] |
20993 | Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen] |
20995 | Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen] |
20998 | Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen] |
20997 | The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen] |
20996 | All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen] |
20988 | Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen] |
20980 | You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen] |
20978 | Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen] |
20985 | Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen] |
20994 | We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen] |
21000 | If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen] |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |