1648 ideas
78 | Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle] |
5248 | Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle] |
548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle] |
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
19396 | Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz] |
19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
2682 | Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle] |
103 | Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle] |
12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle] |
19359 | Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle] |
1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle] |
1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle] |
2118 | All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning [Leibniz] |
19395 | Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God [Leibniz] |
609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle] |
624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle] |
572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle] |
22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle] |
2845 | Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle] |
21360 | Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle] |
11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle] |
17949 | Inquiry is the cause of philosophy [Aristotle] |
12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas] |
559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle] |
112 | Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle] |
13086 | Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16710 | Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
22521 | Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle] |
5021 | An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz] |
12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
22 | Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle] |
76 | The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle] |
2676 | Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle] |
11283 | There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis] |
16897 | Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge] |
13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
23250 | Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle] |
1570 | Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle] |
24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
19335 | Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz] |
5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
1574 | Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle] |
3346 | For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
5082 | Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle] |
2675 | Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle] |
1672 | Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle] |
12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
2801 | Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle] |
623 | It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle] |
19433 | The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz] |
19740 | A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle] |
19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
19404 | Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
3347 | Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
5042 | For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz] |
4642 | No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz] |
1601 | The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle] |
11282 | Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis] |
6561 | A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle] |
23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
11281 | We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle] |
1602 | For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
4333 | Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle] |
1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle] |
1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle] |
1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
1684 | Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle] |
608 | There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle] |
627 | If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle] |
628 | Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle] |
19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |
12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
5847 | It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle] |
2677 | Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle] |
2674 | Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle] |
12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
10953 | The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle] |
10957 | The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle] |
10960 | If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle] |
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle] |
596 | Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle] |
16107 | Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle] |
10944 | A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle] |
12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
12145 | Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle] |
12075 | An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12384 | Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle] |
9066 | You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle] |
12360 | Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
12355 | 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle] |
12352 | Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle] |
11383 | A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle] |
10961 | Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle] |
12356 | If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle] |
17040 | If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle] |
12353 | Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
12081 | Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
11153 | A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
12382 | What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle] |
12080 | Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt] |
15770 | Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle] |
8627 | Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege] |
574 | Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle] |
22529 | Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle] |
22571 | 'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle] |
11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle] |
10913 | Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle] |
12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
10914 | Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle] |
10916 | Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle] |
21356 | Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle] |
19389 | Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz] |
19388 | True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz] |
575 | If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle] |
5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
13157 | Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz] |
15775 | Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle] |
10915 | The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle] |
18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
35 | A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle] |
1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
586 | Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle] |
19165 | Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson] |
13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
2115 | Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz] |
22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
22271 | Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter] |
11060 | Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna] |
18909 | Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
8080 | Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
13912 | Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
8071 | Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
13819 | Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle] |
1668 | An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle] |
562 | Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle] |
573 | The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle] |
9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle] |
13270 | Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle] |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
19370 | 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
12376 | Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle] |
11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle] |
12373 | Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle] |
11148 | Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter] |
1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
12363 | Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle] |
2111 | Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz] |
18896 | Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers] |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
16967 | 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle] |
3300 | Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
11149 | Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle] |
8079 | Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
13004 | Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
19391 | We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz] |
11264 | Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
11258 | We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle] |
11265 | Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11262 | Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11263 | Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11266 | Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11270 | Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11267 | Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11268 | Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11269 | Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11271 | Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11272 | Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11273 | Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11274 | Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11276 | Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11275 | Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
560 | Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle] |
12377 | Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle] |
9076 | Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle] |
13163 | Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz] |
9790 | Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle] |
12372 | The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle] |
13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
10958 | Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle] |
13273 | Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle] |
11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle] |
22962 | Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle] |
11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle] |
12074 | The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle] |
12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
12369 | A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle] |
17844 | The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle] |
17845 | If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle] |
17859 | Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle] |
12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
9147 | Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz] |
12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
17861 | Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle] |
646 | When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle] |
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
19390 | Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz] |
18090 | Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle] |
22929 | Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
13212 | Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle] |
19406 | I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz] |
13190 | I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions [Leibniz] |
22930 | Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
18833 | A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle] |
19375 | The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
18081 | Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz] |
18080 | A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz] |
12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
17851 | Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle] |
17843 | The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle] |
17850 | Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle] |
11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle] |
9793 | Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle] |
13738 | It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle] |
12339 | Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou] |
9974 | Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle] |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
13221 | Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle] |
568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle] |
12348 | There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
11194 | Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
11288 | Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle] |
15776 | There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle] |
611 | Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle] |
1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
11232 | Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle] |
11234 | The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11279 | Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11293 | Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11297 | Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis] |
566 | If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle] |
16090 | Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
570 | Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle] |
12061 | The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle] |
10946 | Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle] |
16152 | Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle] |
11295 | There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis] |
13735 | Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J] |
12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
5105 | The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle] |
1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
5062 | First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz] |
19393 | What is not active is nothing [Leibniz] |
1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle] |
16115 | Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle] |
16100 | True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle] |
16101 | A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle] |
12133 | If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle] |
16118 | Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle] |
22960 | The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle] |
13213 | All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle] |
15768 | An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle] |
17262 | Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder] |
1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle] |
18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle] |
24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle] |
12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
19405 | Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz] |
7565 | Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
13174 | A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz] |
13175 | Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz] |
12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
5060 | All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz] |
19377 | A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz] |
19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
12751 | It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz] |
19363 | Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz] |
19352 | A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz] |
12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
7644 | The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz] |
11857 | He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
7843 | Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz] |
12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
12741 | If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz] |
12740 | The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz] |
13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle] |
12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis] |
13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff] |
3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle] |
12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
12347 | The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle] |
12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
16656 | The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle] |
21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil] |
10419 | If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer] |
13078 | Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz] |
19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
7935 | There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C] |
16161 | Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
15109 | The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle] |
16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
18910 | To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle] |
7686 | For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette] |
11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle] |
11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle] |
10947 | Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle] |
16644 | The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle] |
16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
10956 | If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle] |
8780 | Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach] |
5117 | Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle] |
16113 | Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle] |
16114 | Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12733 | Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz] |
12735 | Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz] |
12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
11387 | The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
12708 | The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz] |
12723 | The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz] |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
15773 | Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle] |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
16753 | Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle] |
13095 | Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz] |
12714 | The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz] |
12713 | Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber] |
13087 | The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
15780 | Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle] |
12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
15766 | Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle] |
15767 | Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle] |
11938 | The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle] |
11379 | Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle] |
12096 | Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt] |
1675 | Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle] |
649 | The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle] |
12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
10948 | Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle] |
643 | How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle] |
633 | If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle] |
16110 | If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle] |
647 | There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle] |
9483 | Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle] |
5130 | It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle] |
640 | All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle] |
641 | Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle] |
16108 | If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle] |
4470 | Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland] |
605 | The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle] |
27 | Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle] |
1677 | We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle] |
645 | If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle] |
28 | How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle] |
16145 | Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle] |
618 | There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle] |
642 | What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle] |
5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
19382 | Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz] |
16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
16158 | Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
16086 | Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle] |
12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
10945 | Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
12062 | Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
11247 | To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle] |
12701 | Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber] |
12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
12693 | A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz] |
16160 | For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
13105 | The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
16156 | Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle] |
1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle] |
12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
16163 | Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
590 | Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle] |
603 | How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle] |
10949 | Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
17838 | Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle] |
17841 | The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle] |
12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
16513 | Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz] |
17041 | Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle] |
17840 | A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle] |
17860 | Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle] |
13272 | Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle] |
17842 | Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle] |
12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle] |
12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
12035 | Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM] |
13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle] |
16172 | Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle] |
16623 | We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle] |
16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12076 | Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11284 | It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
592 | The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle] |
11231 | 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
12716 | The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance [Leibniz] |
13197 | The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy [Leibniz] |
12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle] |
569 | If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle] |
615 | The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle] |
12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
599 | We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle] |
16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle] |
16778 | Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
16084 | Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
600 | Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle] |
1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle] |
7561 | Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
595 | It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle] |
8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe] |
12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle] |
11299 | Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle] |
12060 | Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle] |
10941 | A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle] |
11290 | Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle] |
10959 | The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle] |
12093 | Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12362 | A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle] |
607 | None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle] |
12712 | Substance is that which can act [Leibniz] |
11233 | In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12079 | Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
13091 | Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
7931 | If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C] |
16174 | A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle] |
16096 | Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
10951 | The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle] |
16085 | Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle] |
12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
12071 | Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12084 | Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt] |
16119 | Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
16148 | Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
16112 | A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12002 | Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung] |
11251 | Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis] |
17043 | Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle] |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
12345 | In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
16147 | In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
11285 | The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle] |
16164 | Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
16095 | Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
15853 | A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle] |
16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
16970 | A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle] |
12715 | Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber] |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
16109 | Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle] |
16088 | Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
16104 | Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle] |
11255 | In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12134 | Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle] |
12301 | Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle] |
16092 | In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12300 | Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
12077 | Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12103 | Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt] |
597 | Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle] |
10962 | It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
16142 | A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle] |
16103 | A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
16575 | Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle] |
10942 | If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle] |
13274 | The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle] |
12697 | Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz] |
15852 | A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle] |
15840 | If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle] |
16791 | There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle] |
16136 | A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle] |
9071 | We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle] |
22525 | The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle] |
13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
12878 | Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons] |
11199 | Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
12304 | Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi] |
11294 | Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11298 | Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
13432 | The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz] |
13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
12743 | A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz] |
12099 | Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt] |
17846 | The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle] |
11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle] |
12311 | Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle] |
12069 | Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12070 | Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12088 | Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11998 | Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung] |
12083 | Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11382 | Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis] |
16097 | To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle] |
11188 | The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
11291 | A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle] |
12098 | An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle] |
12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
10964 | Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
13083 | The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz] |
12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
13082 | The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz] |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
16972 | The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
5084 | A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle] |
12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung] |
11244 | Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
16143 | It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle] |
13191 | The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz] |
11878 | Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P] |
16149 | Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle] |
16106 | Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle] |
16144 | Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle] |
12359 | 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
12068 | Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt] |
16141 | In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
16508 | Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle] |
16117 | The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12092 | Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12090 | Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12694 | Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz] |
11862 | Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
16159 | For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
17042 | Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle] |
16173 | Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle] |
16691 | A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle] |
12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
16574 | Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle] |
16572 | Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle] |
16573 | Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle] |
13214 | The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle] |
13215 | If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle] |
12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
11378 | How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12101 | Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle] |
19394 | Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz] |
16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle] |
3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
16134 | We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle] |
17847 | You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle] |
16504 | Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz] |
5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
17554 | There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz] |
11840 | Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle] |
16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
12381 | What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle] |
12611 | Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle] |
12734 | Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz] |
13828 | Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking] |
1690 | A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle] |
14641 | A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle] |
12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
17852 | A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle] |
5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
22518 | The actual must be possible, because it occurred [Aristotle] |
12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
15769 | Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle] |
13084 | How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz] |
15779 | Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle] |
15777 | A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle] |
15778 | Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle] |
11254 | Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis] |
14544 | Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle] |
15774 | We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle] |
4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
13110 | Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle] |
13106 | Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle] |
13108 | Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle] |
12732 | Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz] |
12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
12612 | Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle] |
15108 | Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
13172 | What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz] |
15883 | Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré] |
18822 | Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt] |
7837 | Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
13080 | Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
12072 | For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12073 | 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12378 | The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle] |
547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle] |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
19397 | Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz] |
22587 | Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle] |
12364 | We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle] |
19332 | For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
12370 | Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle] |
12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
12366 | We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle] |
1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle] |
4391 | Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle] |
10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle] |
544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle] |
546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle] |
1673 | Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle] |
13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
2573 | To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle] |
19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
12739 | If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz] |
12742 | A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz] |
5509 | Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
7568 | Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
9344 | Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
9155 | An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz] |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
19353 | 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz] |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle] |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
19419 | Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz] |
16717 | Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle] |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle] |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
12721 | Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz] |
19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle] |
13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
2110 | We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz] |
12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
543 | All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle] |
5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
23309 | Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
1693 | Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle] |
22141 | It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle] |
95 | If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle] |
79 | Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle] |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
9067 | Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle] |
8331 | To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle] |
1671 | Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle] |
5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle] |
5020 | Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz] |
583 | The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle] |
19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
581 | Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle] |
19392 | I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz] |
12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
584 | If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle] |
585 | If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle] |
576 | If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle] |
12383 | There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle] |
12309 | There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle] |
11386 | Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle] |
1674 | All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle] |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
24068 | Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
17310 | Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
21359 | Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle] |
1667 | Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle] |
12365 | We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle] |
10918 | Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle] |
12374 | Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle] |
12148 | Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle] |
1679 | Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle] |
1680 | Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle] |
1691 | Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle] |
12371 | A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle] |
12147 | The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle] |
12738 | Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz] |
5862 | A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle] |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
5854 | Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle] |
19387 | Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz] |
1683 | We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle] |
12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
12367 | What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle] |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12385 | Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle] |
11385 | Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle] |
12380 | Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle] |
5080 | We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle] |
1689 | Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle] |
11289 | Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle] |
1686 | What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle] |
11250 | Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12045 | Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas] |
16969 | Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle] |
16968 | There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle] |
11246 | Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
13109 | Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle] |
12357 | Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
1669 | The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle] |
19398 | Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes [Leibniz] |
22522 | To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle] |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
12729 | The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz] |
13092 | The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz] |
12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
15119 | Aristotelian explanation by essence may need to draw on knowledge of other essences [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
22524 | The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle] |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
11384 | We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle] |
16135 | Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle] |
16105 | We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle] |
11296 | The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle] |
11999 | Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung] |
13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
1678 | Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle] |
13158 | The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz] |
12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
5146 | Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle] |
5147 | In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle] |
5148 | The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle] |
5232 | If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle] |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
5145 | The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle] |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
23218 | The brain has no responsibility for sensations, which occur in the heart [Aristotle] |
19354 | Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
19438 | Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz] |
12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
19355 | The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz] |
2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
8775 | A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach] |
8776 | We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach] |
18911 | Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
9068 | Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle] |
9069 | A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle] |
9088 | Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle] |
16153 | Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
9791 | Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle] |
13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
22528 | The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle] |
19362 | We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz] |
571 | Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle] |
5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
5266 | It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle] |
5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
8007 | Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre] |
12961 | For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
4118 | A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle] |
22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
20192 | Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski] |
19413 | If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz] |
19367 | Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz] |
2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
7841 | We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz] |
13162 | Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz] |
5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
5510 | Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
7564 | Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
19350 | We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz] |
19421 | Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz] |
19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
2568 | Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach] |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
4405 | The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle] |
1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
19415 | Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz] |
22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
5160 | There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle] |
23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
4326 | Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
72 | Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle] |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
23311 | Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
23310 | Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle] |
11245 | Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle] |
19423 | By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz] |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
8781 | The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach] |
19372 | Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
10954 | It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle] |
8769 | If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach] |
9789 | You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle] |
9070 | We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle] |
9788 | Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle] |
9792 | Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle] |
9077 | Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle] |
13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
8770 | 'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach] |
8771 | 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach] |
8772 | We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach] |
8773 | Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach] |
8774 | The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach] |
8778 | Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach] |
8777 | If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach] |
8779 | We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach] |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
9075 | If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle] |
2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
13467 | Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD] |
5107 | Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle] |
12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle] |
13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
22570 | Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle] |
5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle] |
1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
12368 | Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle] |
1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle] |
4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
23320 | Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
19331 | Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz] |
5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
22574 | A community can lack self-control [Aristotle] |
68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle] |
4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham] |
4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle] |
5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle] |
23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle] |
23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
19365 | Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
5247 | Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle] |
80 | Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle] |
5249 | One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle] |
82 | The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle] |
22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
69 | We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle] |
20212 | Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle] |
4371 | Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
73 | Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle] |
67 | Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle] |
5218 | Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle] |
81 | For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle] |
20042 | We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle] |
5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle] |
5213 | If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle] |
22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
4384 | For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle] |
23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle] |
12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
52 | We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle] |
8110 | Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner] |
12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
5851 | Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle] |
2837 | Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle] |
636 | Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle] |
5063 | Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz] |
16566 | Poetry is more philosophic than history, as it concerns universals, not particulars [Aristotle] |
2824 | The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle] |
635 | The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle] |
2846 | Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle] |
5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
45 | We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle] |
5153 | There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle] |
46 | We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle] |
22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
7569 | Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle] |
5134 | Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle] |
31 | If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle] |
5231 | To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle] |
22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
5234 | For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle] |
5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle] |
5075 | Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle] |
21 | Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle] |
2807 | Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle] |
4370 | For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
18227 | We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle] |
4381 | How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
398 | Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle] |
15772 | A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle] |
33 | Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle] |
23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
5154 | Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle] |
5268 | Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle] |
5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
5229 | The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle] |
13173 | Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz] |
19420 | Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz] |
19346 | Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz] |
90 | All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle] |
22582 | Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle] |
12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
5263 | Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle] |
5262 | Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle] |
2689 | Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle] |
101 | Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle] |
5142 | Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle] |
5243 | The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle] |
92 | Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle] |
2810 | Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle] |
3559 | For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas] |
19340 | Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz] |
629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle] |
5128 | Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle] |
5129 | There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
20 | The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle] |
5110 | Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle] |
5131 | Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle] |
5135 | Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle] |
12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
5269 | Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle] |
23 | The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle] |
109 | Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle] |
19366 | You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz] |
5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
22555 | The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle] |
26 | Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle] |
5136 | Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle] |
5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
25 | You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle] |
18673 | Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi] |
5127 | Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle] |
5143 | Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle] |
2681 | Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle] |
5132 | Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle] |
30 | Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle] |
5019 | Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz] |
5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
39 | Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle] |
5139 | If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle] |
5144 | Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle] |
5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
106 | The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle] |
100 | The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle] |
12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
4374 | For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
5230 | There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle] |
383 | God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle] |
5270 | Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle] |
5259 | If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle] |
96 | Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle] |
97 | There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle] |
98 | It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle] |
99 | If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle] |
5256 | Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle] |
5258 | While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle] |
49 | Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle] |
53 | Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle] |
84 | The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle] |
88 | Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle] |
5856 | Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle] |
91 | A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle] |
71 | Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle] |
12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
5111 | All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle] |
34 | The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle] |
5853 | The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle] |
5848 | All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle] |
5137 | Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle] |
4342 | Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
4382 | Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle] |
54 | Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle] |
58 | If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle] |
4373 | Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
63 | Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle] |
5214 | Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle] |
107 | A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle] |
5215 | There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle] |
5216 | An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle] |
55 | People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle] |
5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
591 | Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle] |
5149 | The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle] |
5156 | How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle] |
625 | Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle] |
5157 | If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle] |
5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
4369 | It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg] |
5158 | Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle] |
5237 | We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle] |
3548 | Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle] |
5223 | We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle] |
4367 | Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle] |
4362 | Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle] |
5225 | The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle] |
22557 | Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle] |
56 | A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle] |
93 | Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle] |
2841 | People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle] |
44 | We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle] |
51 | True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle] |
43 | Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle] |
5152 | Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle] |
4378 | We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
6793 | People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle] |
57 | We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle] |
2690 | Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle] |
5222 | A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle] |
4394 | People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle] |
5239 | When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle] |
4379 | It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle] |
4386 | Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
5250 | The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle] |
5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
3545 | The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas] |
47 | Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle] |
4406 | Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle] |
60 | The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle] |
61 | Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle] |
4388 | One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle] |
4387 | In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle] |
62 | We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle] |
2829 | The law is the mean [Aristotle] |
5159 | The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle] |
65 | The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle] |
5161 | To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle] |
5235 | Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle] |
5238 | The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle] |
23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
5217 | At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle] |
5236 | It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle] |
23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
22590 | Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle] |
64 | There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle] |
4117 | Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle] |
23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
5251 | Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle] |
12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
2813 | It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle] |
23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
4389 | What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle] |
23556 | Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle] |
5151 | Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle] |
5242 | Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle] |
22553 | Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle] |
5240 | The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle] |
5261 | Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle] |
5226 | True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle] |
5224 | Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle] |
23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
5233 | Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle] |
4119 | If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B] |
23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
24 | Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle] |
5857 | The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle] |
110 | Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle] |
104 | Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle] |
18229 | Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle] |
5272 | The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle] |
18232 | The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle] |
621 | Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle] |
105 | We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle] |
111 | The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle] |
5138 | The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle] |
38 | A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle] |
1665 | It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle] |
5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
108 | The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle] |
22561 | The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle] |
5859 | Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle] |
2808 | Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle] |
12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
85 | Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle] |
23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
2686 | Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
2687 | For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
19407 | We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz] |
5252 | 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle] |
5245 | Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle] |
5265 | Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle] |
2803 | Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle] |
2820 | People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle] |
22586 | Only humans have reason [Aristotle] |
12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
5133 | Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle] |
22523 | The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle] |
2805 | A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle] |
22526 | People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle] |
22535 | Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle] |
22532 | A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle] |
22584 | A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle] |
22581 | The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle] |
22548 | A city aims at living well [Aristotle] |
86 | A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle] |
23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
5140 | Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle] |
22577 | What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle] |
22579 | The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle] |
2431 | Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle] |
22578 | The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle] |
2832 | The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle] |
2821 | The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle] |
22546 | A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle] |
2835 | Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle] |
22580 | The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle] |
5852 | The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle] |
21046 | The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle] |
2973 | We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle] |
22558 | Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle] |
22566 | The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle] |
22563 | The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle] |
2818 | The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
22545 | A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle] |
22544 | A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle] |
22541 | Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle] |
2819 | The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle] |
22542 | People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle] |
22552 | The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle] |
22583 | The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle] |
5241 | We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle] |
22543 | In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle] |
22539 | Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle] |
22572 | Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle] |
87 | Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle] |
2826 | Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle] |
22567 | Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle] |
22560 | Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle] |
22562 | Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle] |
2823 | The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle] |
22533 | If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle] |
2817 | It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle] |
22576 | No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle] |
22549 | In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle] |
22575 | Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle] |
22531 | We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle] |
5260 | Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle] |
5264 | Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle] |
22564 | Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle] |
22585 | Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle] |
22565 | The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle] |
22589 | Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle] |
22534 | People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle] |
22538 | Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle] |
22536 | There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle] |
22530 | Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle] |
21358 | Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle] |
21047 | Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
20092 | One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle] |
2833 | Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle] |
2834 | It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle] |
2830 | We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle] |
22569 | The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle] |
22550 | It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle] |
22568 | Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle] |
2814 | Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle] |
22540 | Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle] |
2828 | Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle] |
22537 | Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle] |
22573 | The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
22527 | Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle] |
22547 | Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle] |
21044 | For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
2825 | The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle] |
2816 | If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle] |
2806 | Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle] |
22556 | Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle] |
2827 | It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle] |
22551 | Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle] |
22554 | It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle] |
7574 | Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
5246 | Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle] |
12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
1660 | It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle] |
2840 | The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle] |
2811 | A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle] |
22588 | A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle] |
2847 | The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle] |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
2842 | Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle] |
5150 | Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle] |
11241 | Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle] |
2844 | Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle] |
5228 | A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle] |
5092 | Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle] |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
5113 | Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle] |
632 | Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle] |
5085 | 'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle] |
2809 | If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle] |
5089 | Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle] |
396 | There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle] |
394 | An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle] |
626 | Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle] |
5087 | A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle] |
5091 | Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle] |
2684 | Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle] |
5227 | The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle] |
2800 | The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle] |
5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
19376 | A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts [Leibniz] |
5086 | The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle] |
5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
5108 | Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle] |
5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |
19356 | Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz] |
17858 | Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle] |
5093 | Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle] |
5095 | The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle] |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
16590 | Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle] |
12001 | Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung] |
10955 | Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle] |
601 | Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle] |
13216 | Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle] |
17994 | The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle] |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
12299 | Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
16762 | Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle] |
15771 | Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle] |
12868 | Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle] |
15954 | Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P] |
16099 | The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
13224 | There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle] |
616 | It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle] |
17464 | When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle] |
16102 | Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
17463 | An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle] |
16594 | The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle] |
13223 | Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle] |
16098 | I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
13220 | Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle] |
15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
12728 | Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber] |
2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
19374 | Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz] |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
13210 | Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle] |
13211 | If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle] |
2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
7560 | Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz] |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
19416 | Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz] |
19422 | Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz] |
19436 | Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action [Leibniz] |
13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
16683 | Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
10952 | Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle] |
12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
12375 | Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle] |
11252 | The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11253 | A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis] |
13107 | Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle] |
5219 | Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle] |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
8332 | The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle] |
5059 | Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz] |
561 | Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle] |
5861 | People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle] |
588 | We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle] |
634 | Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle] |
14543 | When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
2117 | The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz] |
12702 | Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz] |
12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle] |
19403 | Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz] |
12725 | Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber] |
16507 | The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz] |
11945 | In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz] |
13198 | Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz] |
13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
9787 | Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle] |
7859 | Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
5114 | If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle] |
5116 | When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle] |
399 | If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle] |
24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
12696 | Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz] |
19348 | All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change [Leibniz] |
12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
20063 | Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle] |
24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
15307 | Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz] |
12719 | Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |
13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |
13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
13097 | Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz] |
16709 | Some people return to scholastic mysterious qualities, disguising them as 'forces' [Leibniz] |
20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle] |
12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |
20918 | Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle] |
13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
5097 | If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle] |
2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
5099 | The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle] |
5098 | Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle] |
12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
20920 | If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle] |
19384 | Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz] |
13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |
2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
13228 | There is no time without movement [Aristotle] |
22967 | It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle] |
5106 | Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle] |
22885 | For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon] |
8590 | Time does not exist without change [Aristotle] |
5104 | Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle] |
22965 | Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle] |
22959 | Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle] |
22964 | Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle] |
12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |
22956 | How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle] |
5102 | If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle] |
12720 | Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz] |
2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
5103 | Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle] |
22961 | The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle] |
22908 | When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz] |
22916 | Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle] |
16693 | Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle] |
22958 | Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle] |
22968 | Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle] |
22963 | We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle] |
22957 | We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle] |
22966 | The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle] |
403 | The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle] |
402 | The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle] |
5083 | Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle] |
16595 | If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle] |
619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle] |
613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle] |
1498 | Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle] |
620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle] |
395 | It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle] |
24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |
23302 | Plants have far less life than animals, but more life than other corporeal entities [Aristotle] |
5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |
23301 | There is a gradual proceeding from the inanimate to animals, with no clear borderlines [Aristotle] |
19414 | Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz] |
12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
19326 | God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz] |
5119 | The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle] |
2836 | God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle] |
19439 | God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz] |
622 | There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle] |
2114 | This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz] |
5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |
1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
19327 | The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz] |
21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
7603 | God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K] |
22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
19344 | God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz] |
19330 | If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz] |
16165 | For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
3889 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton] |
19325 | God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz] |
2113 | God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz] |
13227 | Being is better than not-being [Aristotle] |
2116 | The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz] |
12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |
1688 | Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle] |
2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |
19418 | Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz] |
13226 | An Order controls all things [Aristotle] |
610 | The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle] |
19417 | All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz] |
19329 | The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz] |
2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |
12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |
5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |
2802 | Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle] |
7842 | Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
12097 | There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle] |
19437 | Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz] |
12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
24037 | We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle] |
12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |
12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |
19339 | Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz] |
13164 | God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz] |
19337 | How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz] |
19345 | Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz] |
5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |