81 ideas
16841 | Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton] |
16854 | Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton] |
16814 | Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton] |
19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
16825 | How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton] |
19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
16798 | We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton] |
16799 | Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton] |
16856 | It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton] |
16857 | Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton] |
16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
16850 | Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton] |
16807 | An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton] |
16808 | An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton] |
16806 | An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton] |
16822 | Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton] |
16816 | In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton] |
16826 | With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton] |
16811 | An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton] |
16810 | Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton] |
16829 | We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton] |
16809 | Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton] |
16812 | An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton] |
16813 | To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton] |
16815 | Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton] |
16846 | A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton] |
16849 | Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton] |
16848 | Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton] |
16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
16840 | To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton] |
16824 | Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton] |
16817 | Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton] |
16818 | The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton] |
16820 | Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton] |
16819 | IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton] |
16828 | IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton] |
16844 | A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton] |
16853 | We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton] |
16821 | Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton] |
16838 | Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton] |
16855 | The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton] |
16852 | Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton] |
8143 | Self is the rider, intellect the charioteer, mind the reins, and body the chariot [Anon (Upan)] |
8147 | We have an apparent and a true self; only the second one exists, and we must seek to know it [Anon (Upan)] |
8155 | Without speech we cannot know right/wrong, true/false, good/bad, or pleasant/unpleasant [Anon (Upan)] |
8142 | The wise prefer good to pleasure; the foolish are drawn to pleasure by desire [Anon (Upan)] |
8151 | Let your teacher be a god to you [Anon (Upan)] |
8153 | By knowing one piece of clay or gold, you know all of clay or gold [Anon (Upan)] |
16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |
8154 | Originally there must have been just Existence, which could not come from non-existence [Anon (Upan)] |
8148 | Brahma, supreme god and protector of the universe, arose from the ocean of existence [Anon (Upan)] |
8144 | Brahman is the Uncaused Cause [Anon (Upan)] |
8152 | Earth, food, fire, sun are all forms of Brahman [Anon (Upan)] |
8159 | Damayata - be self-controlled! Datta - be charitable! Dayadhwam - be compassionate! [Anon (Upan)] |
8156 | The gods are not worshipped for their own sake, but for the sake of the Self [Anon (Upan)] |
8157 | A man with desires is continually reborn, until his desires are stilled [Anon (Upan)] |
8145 | Those ignorant of Atman return as animals or plants, according to their merits [Anon (Upan)] |
8149 | Charity and ritual observance distract from the highest good of religion [Anon (Upan)] |
8158 | Do not seek to know Brahman by arguments, for arguments are idle and vain [Anon (Upan)] |
8146 | The immortal in us is the part that never sleeps, and shapes our dreams [Anon (Upan)] |
8150 | The immortal Self and the sad individual self are like two golden birds perched on one tree [Anon (Upan)] |