Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Peter Smith, Adam Swift and Michel de Montaigne

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82 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Montaigne was the founding father of liberalism [Montaigne, by Gopnik]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P]
A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P]
An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P]
The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P]
Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P]
A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P]
A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P]
Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P]
A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P]
'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P]
A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P]
A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P]
Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P]
A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P]
A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P]
The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P]
The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P]
The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / b. Baby arithmetic
Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P]
Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / c. Robinson arithmetic
Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P]
Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P]
Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Rules and duties are based on the will, as that is all we control [Montaigne]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Apart from the fear, dying is an easy duty [Montaigne]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We must fight fiercely to hang on to the few pleasures which survive into old age [Montaigne]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift]
Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift]
Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift]
Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift]
Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift]
A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift]
Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne]