Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Peter Watson, John Dupr and Daniel C. Dennett

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


120 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Because of Darwin, wisdom as a definite attainable state has faded [Watson]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
The three key ideas are the soul, Europe, and the experiment [Watson]
The big idea: imitation, the soul, experiments, God, heliocentric universe, evolution? [Watson]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Babylonian thinking used analogy, rather than deduction or induction [Watson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Mesopotamian numbers applied to specific things, and then became abstract [Watson]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett]
Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett]
Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Dennett, by Lowe]
What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett]
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett]
Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
There are 23 core brain functions, with known circuit, transmitters, genes and behaviour [Watson]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett]
We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett]
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett]
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett]
We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson]
There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett]
Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett]
Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett]
Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality [Dennett, by Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Humans have been hunter-gatherers for 99.5% of their existence [Watson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Modern democracy is actually elective oligarchy [Watson]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Greek philosophers invented the concept of 'nature' as their special subject [Watson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The Uncertainty Principle implies that cause and effect can't be measured [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
The interference of light through two slits confirmed that it is waves [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons rotate in hyrogen atoms 10^13 times per second [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum theory explains why nature is made up of units, such as elements [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Only four particles are needed for matter: up and down quark, electron, electron-neutrino [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
The shape of molecules is important, as well as the atoms and their bonds [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
In 1828 the animal substance urea was manufactured from inorganic ingredients [Watson]
Information is physical, and living can be seen as replicating and preserving information [Watson]
Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Darwin's idea was the best idea ever [Dennett]
DNA mutation suggests humans and chimpanzees diverged 6.6 million years ago [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
During the rise of civilizations, the main gods changed from female to male [Watson]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Hinduism has no founder, or prophet, or creed, or ecclesiastical structure [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East [Watson]
Modern Judaism became stabilised in 200 CE [Watson]
The Israelites may have asserted the uniqueness of Yahweh to justify land claims [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 3. Zoroastrianism
The Gathas (hymns) of Zoroastrianism date from about 1000 BCE [Watson]
Zoroaster conceived the afterlife, judgement, heaven and hell, and the devil [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Jesus never intended to start a new religion [Watson]
Paul's early writings mention few striking episodes from Jesus' life [Watson]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 1. Confucianism
Confucius revered the spiritual world, but not the supernatural, or a personal god, or the afterlife [Watson]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
Taoism aims at freedom from the world, the body, the mind, and nature [Watson]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The three basic ingredients of religion are: the soul, seers or priests, and ritual [Watson]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
In ancient Athens the souls of the dead are received by the 'upper air' [Watson]