33 ideas
| 4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
| 4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
| 4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
| 4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
| 14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
| 14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
| 14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
| 14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
| 14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
| 14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
| 14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
| 14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
| 14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
| 14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
| 14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
| 14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
| 14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
| 4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
| 4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
| 4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
| 8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
| 14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
| 4787 | Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| 14586 | Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |