37 ideas
| 18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 7791 | The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
| 9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
| 9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
| 9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
| 11002 | Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read] |
| 9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
| 7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
| 9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
| 21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
| 21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
| 6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
| 21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
| 18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
| 9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
| 18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 4787 | Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| 14586 | Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
| 4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |