69 ideas
| 16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
| 16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
| 16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
| 16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
| 16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
| 16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
| 16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
| 16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
| 16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
| 16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
| 16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
| 16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
| 16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
| 16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
| 16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
| 16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
| 16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
| 14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
| 16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
| 16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
| 16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
| 16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
| 16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
| 16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
| 16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
| 16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
| 16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
| 16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
| 16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
| 16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
| 16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
| 16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
| 16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
| 16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
| 16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
| 16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
| 16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
| 22849 | Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet] |
| 22848 | People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet] |
| 22838 | Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet] |
| 22846 | The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet] |
| 22835 | Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet] |
| 22831 | Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet] |
| 22839 | Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet] |
| 22847 | Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet] |
| 22821 | Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet] |
| 22834 | Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet] |
| 22822 | Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet] |
| 22841 | Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet] |
| 22842 | For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet] |
| 22830 | Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet] |
| 22829 | Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet] |
| 22836 | 'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet] |
| 22837 | Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet] |
| 22844 | First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet] |
| 22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
| 22843 | Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet] |
| 22845 | Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet] |
| 22828 | The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet] |
| 22826 | From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet] |
| 22823 | The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet] |
| 22827 | Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet] |
| 22825 | The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet] |
| 22832 | Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet] |
| 14586 | Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 4787 | Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| 16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
| 4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| 16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |