41 ideas
7791 | The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
11002 | Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read] |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
12900 | How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach] |
12901 | If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach] |
12902 | Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach] |
6027 | From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus] |
5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |
22241 | Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus] |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |