Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Philodemus, Rita Carter and Michael Williams

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55 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M]
Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R]
The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R]
In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R]
Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus]