165 ideas
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
| 21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
| 15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
| 15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
| 15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 14626 | In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson] |
| 15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
| 15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
| 15130 | If a property is possible, there is something which can have it [Williamson] |
| 15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
| 21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
| 21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
| 21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
| 18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
| 15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
| 21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
| 9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
| 19482 | Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.] |
| 19483 | CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
| 21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
| 21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
| 21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
| 21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
| 21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
| 21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
| 9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| 21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
| 21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
| 21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
| 21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
| 21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
| 21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
| 21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
| 21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
| 21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
| 21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
| 21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
| 21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
| 14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
| 14623 | Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson] |
| 14624 | Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson] |
| 14531 | Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
| 18925 | If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron] |
| 21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
| 4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
| 19512 | Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose] |
| 19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
| 19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
| 19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
| 19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
| 19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
| 19737 | A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.] |
| 6027 | From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus] |
| 14628 | Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 19736 | Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 16419 | No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.] |
| 16418 | People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.] |
| 16417 | About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.] |
| 19484 | Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.] |
| 21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
| 18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
| 19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
| 19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
| 19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 22241 | Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 21167 | Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.] |
| 19950 | Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.] |
| 21176 | In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.] |
| 21147 | Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.] |
| 19478 | Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.] |
| 21155 | Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.] |
| 21161 | In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.] |
| 21146 | Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.] |
| 19474 | Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.] |
| 19473 | The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.] |
| 21148 | The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.] |
| 21152 | The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.] |
| 21151 | Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.] |
| 21143 | Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.] |
| 21150 | Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.] |
| 21142 | Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.] |
| 21154 | Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.] |
| 21145 | The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.] |
| 21153 | The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.] |
| 21156 | The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.] |
| 21164 | Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.] |
| 21170 | The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.] |
| 21158 | Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.] |
| 21165 | Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.] |
| 21140 | Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.] |
| 21157 | Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.] |
| 21149 | Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.] |
| 21163 | The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.] |
| 21168 | Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.] |
| 21144 | Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.] |
| 21138 | Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.] |
| 21141 | Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.] |
| 21169 | Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.] |
| 21166 | Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.] |
| 21171 | The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.] |
| 19953 | In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.] |
| 19476 | String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.] |
| 21175 | String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.] |
| 21177 | String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.] |
| 21178 | String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.] |
| 21179 | Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.] |
| 19954 | It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.] |
| 21159 | Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.] |
| 21162 | Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.] |
| 21172 | The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.] |
| 21173 | Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.] |
| 19947 | Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.] |
| 21160 | The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.] |
| 19955 | Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.] |
| 19948 | Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.] |
| 19475 | Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.] |
| 19949 | Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.] |
| 19951 | Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.] |
| 19477 | General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.] |
| 19952 | Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.] |
| 16420 | 84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.] |
| 21174 | Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.] |
| 17604 | We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.] |
| 17603 | Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.] |
| 15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |