Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Philolaus, Anaxarchus and Richard Rorty

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
19090 If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
2557 Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
2556 Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
4726 Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
2549 For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
472 No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
2548 If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
6599 Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
2566 You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
2553 The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
2550 Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2554 Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2565 Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2560 Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
2562 A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2559 Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
22511 Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
2558 Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
1518 Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus]
1519 Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus]
473 There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
469 Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
476 Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
1787 Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius]