15 ideas
| 17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
| 17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
| 17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
| 17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
| 22137 | Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter] |
| 18197 | Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem] |
| 17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
| 17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
| 17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
| 17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
| 17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
| 17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |