33 ideas
| 4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
| 4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
| 16668 | Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi] |
| 16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
| 14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
| 14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
| 14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
| 14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
| 14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
| 14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
| 14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
| 14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
| 14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
| 14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
| 14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
| 14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
| 14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
| 4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
| 4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
| 16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
| 3400 | Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi] |
| 4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
| 4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
| 4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
| 4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
| 4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
| 4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
| 4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
| 14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
| 4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
| 4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
| 16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
| 16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |