13 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
16728 | Logicians acknowledge too few things, while others acknowledge too many [Fitzralph] |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
16668 | Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi] |
16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
3400 | Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi] |
16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |