Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pierre Gassendi, Stuart Glennan and Margaret Cavendish

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14 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi]
If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The brain, and all the mental events within it, consists entirely of sensitive and rational matter [Cavendish]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]