Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pindar, Alexander Miller and Peter F. Strawson

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
7920 Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
7922 Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
7921 Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
10842 The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
10843 Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
10844 The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10841 The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8358 There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
6413 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling]
8354 Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
16980 We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
16979 It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
9282 I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
9263 A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
8356 The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
10430 Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10448 If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
8355 Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P]
8357 If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9281 The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
6017 Nomos is king [Pindar]