16 ideas
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
8921 | Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman] |
8698 | Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend] |
9557 | Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara] |
10263 | Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman] |
8922 | Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |