Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Plato, Tuckness,A/Wolf,C and Kit Fine

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723 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato]
Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato]
Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato]
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato]
Philosophers become as divine and orderly as possible, by studying divinity and order [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato]
For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato]
We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato]
Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
The winds of the discussion should decide its destination [Plato]
We shouldn't always follow where the argument leads! [Lewis on Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato]
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato]
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things [Plato]
My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato]
Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Mortals are incapable of being fully rational [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato]
Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
Dialectic is the only method of inquiry which uproots the things which it takes for granted [Plato]
The ability to take an overview is the distinguishing mark of a dialectician [Plato]
For Plato, rationality is a vision of and love of a cosmic rational order [Plato, by Taylor,C]
Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato]
Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato]
Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato]
We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato]
You must never go against what you actually believe [Plato]
In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
People often merely practice eristic instead of dialectic, because they don't analyse the subject-matter [Plato]
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato]
No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato]
Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]
The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
In mathematics certain things have to be accepted without further explanation [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato]
Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K]
It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K]
Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K]
Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry can lead the mind upwards to truth and philosophy [Plato]
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato]
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We aim for elevated discussion of pure numbers, not attaching them to physical objects [Plato]
In pure numbers, all ones are equal, with no internal parts [Plato]
Geometry is not an activity, but the study of unchanging knowledge [Plato]
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K]
My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato]
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato]
To become rational, philosophers must rise from becoming into being [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being depends on the Good, which is not itself being, but superior to being [Plato]
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K]
Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K]
Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K]
Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato]
Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K]
Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The best things (gods, healthy bodies, good souls) are least liable to change [Plato]
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K]
2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato]
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
Plato's reality has unchanging Parmenidean forms, and Heraclitean flux [Plato, by Fogelin]
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K]
The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K]
A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K]
Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K]
Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
The plurality of beautiful things must belong to a single class, because they have a single particular character [Plato]
It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato]
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik]
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
Craftsmen making furniture refer to the form, but no one manufactures the form of furniture [Plato]
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato]
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato]
Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas]
Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato]
In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato]
For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato]
Plato's Forms are said to have no location in space [Plato, by Aristotle]
We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato]
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
Forms are not universals, as they don't cover every general term [Plato, by Annas]
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato]
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato]
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Plato mistakenly thought forms were totally abstracted away from matter [Bacon on Plato]
Plato's Forms not only do not come from the senses, but they are beyond possibility of sensing [Plato, by Kant]
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato]
If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge must be of the permanent unchanging nature of things [Plato]
Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato]
If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato]
The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato]
If theory and practice conflict, the best part of the mind accepts theory, so the other part is of lower grade [Plato]
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato]
Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato]
True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato]
As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato]
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato]
Psychic conflict is clear if appetite is close to the body and reason fairly separate [Plato, by Modrak]
There is a third element to the mind - spirit - lying between reason and appetite [Plato]
The soul is self-motion [Plato]
Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch]
Soul is what is defined by 'self-generating motion' [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The mind has parts, because we have inner conflicts [Plato]
The soul seems to have an infinity of parts [Aristotle on Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
My individuality is my soul, which carries my body around [Plato]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato]
Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie]
Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K]
We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K]
Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K]
Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K]
An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K]
Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K]
We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K]
An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
The 'Republic' is a great work of rhetorical theory [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato]
Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato]
The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato]
An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato]
Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
All activity aims at the good [Plato]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
For Plato and Aristotle there is no will; there is only rational desire for what is seen as good [Plato, by Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
We avoid evil either through a natural aversion, or because we have acquired knowledge [Plato]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
If goodness needs true opinion but not knowledge, you can skip the 'examined life' [Vlastos on Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato]
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato]
What is fine is always difficult [Plato]
Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato]
Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato]
Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato]
People who value beauty above virtue insult the soul by placing the body above it [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato]
Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato]
Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato]
Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Without the surface decoration, poetry shows only appearances and nothing of what is real [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
Representation is two steps removed from the truth [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Artists should be excluded from a law-abiding community, because they destroy the rational mind [Plato]
Truth is closely related to proportion [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
What is fine is the parent of goodness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
To understand morality requires a soul [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
I suggest that we forget about trying to define goodness itself for the time being [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good cannot be expressed in words, but imprints itself upon the soul [Plato, by Celsus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Plato found that he could only enforce rational moral justification by creating an authoritarian society [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value [Nietzsche on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A thing's function is what it alone can do, or what it does better than other things [Plato]
If something has a function then it has a state of being good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Goodness is mental health, badness is mental sickness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato]
Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato]
Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
If we were invisible, would the just man become like the unjust? [Plato]
Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato]
Clever criminals do well at first, but not in the long run [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The main aim is to understand goodness, which gives everything its value and advantage [Plato]
Every person, and every activity, aims at the good [Plato]
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato]
Good has the same role in the world of knowledge as the sun has in the physical world [Plato]
The sight of goodness leads to all that is fine and true and right [Plato]
For Plato we abandon honour and pleasure once we see the Good [Plato, by Taylor,C]
The good is beautiful [Plato]
Goodness makes truth and knowledge possible [Plato]
Bad is always destructive, where good preserves and benefits [Plato]
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG]
Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
Pleasure is commonly thought to be the good, though the more ingenious prefer knowledge [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato]
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato]
Even people who think pleasure is the good admit that there are bad pleasures [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
An action is only just if it is performed by someone with a just character and outlook [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Attempted murder is like real murder, but we should respect the luck which avoided total ruin [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
Nice smells are intensive, have no preceding pain, and no bad after-effect [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato]
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato]
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato]
It would be strange if the gods rewarded those who experienced the most pleasure in life [Plato]
Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
Philosophers are concerned with totally non-physical pleasures [Plato]
Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato]
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato]
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
There are three types of pleasure, for reason, for spirit and for appetite [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato]
Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato]
Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato]
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Excessive pleasure deranges people, making the other virtues impossible [Plato]
The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all [Plato]
If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato]
Pleasure-seekers desperately seek illusory satisfaction, like filling a leaky vessel [Plato]
In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
We should behave well even if invisible, for the health of the mind [Plato]
Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato]
Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato]
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato]
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Isn't it better to have a reputation for goodness than to actually be good? [Plato]
Morality is a compromise, showing restraint, to avoid suffering wrong without compensation [Plato]
Justice is merely the interests of the stronger party [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Surely you don't return a borrowed weapon to a mad friend? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Is right just the interests of the powerful? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Sin first, then sacrifice to the gods from the proceeds [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato]
Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato]
For Plato, virtue is its own reward [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
Virtue is a concord of reason and emotion, with pleasure and pain trained to correct ends [Plato]
A serious desire for moral excellence is very rare indeed [Plato]
Every crime is the result of excessive self-love [Plato]
The only worthwhile life is one devoted to physical and moral perfection [Plato]
Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato]
The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato]
Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]
The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]
True goodness requires mental unity and harmony [Plato]
The Guardians must aim to discover the common element in the four cardinal virtues [Plato]
Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
A good community necessarily has wisdom, courage, self-discipline and morality [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato]
If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato]
Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato]
Simonides said morality is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies [Plato]
Injustice is the mastery of the soul by bad feelings, even if they do not lead to harm [Plato]
If the parts of our soul do their correct work, we will be just people, and will act justly [Plato]
Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The best people are produced where there is no excess of wealth or poverty [Plato]
Virtue and great wealth are incompatible [Plato]
War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato]
Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
People need society because the individual has too many needs [Plato]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf]
People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato]
All exchanges in a community are for mutual benefit [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
After a taste of mutual harm, men make a legal contract to avoid it [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
People doing their jobs properly is the fourth cardinal virtue for a city [Plato]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Totalitarian states destroy friendships and community spirit [Plato]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Reluctant rulers make a better and more unified administration [Plato]
Only rule by philosophers of integrity can keep a community healthy [Plato]
If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle]
Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf]
Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf]
Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf]
How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf]
Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Education in virtue produces citizens who are active but obedient [Plato]
We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf]
Is there anything better for a community than to produce excellent people? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato]
Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato]
Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato]
Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato]
If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf]
Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf]
One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf]
Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf]
Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them [Plato]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice is granting the equality which unequals deserve [Plato]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf]
If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Dialectic is the highest and most important part of the curriculum [Plato]
Mathematics has the widest application of any subject on the curriculum [Plato]
Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato]
Children's games should channel their pleasures into adult activity [Plato]
Control of education is the key office of state, and should go to the best citizen [Plato]
To gain knowledge, turn away from the world of change, and focus on true goodness [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
The best way to educate the young is not to rebuke them, but to set a good example [Plato]
Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato]
Compulsory intellectual work never remains in the mind [Plato]
Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato]
Education is channelling a child's feelings into the right course before it understands why [Plato]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
While sex is very pleasant, it should be in secret, as it looks contemptible [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato]
The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Creation is not for you; you exist for the sake of creation [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]
A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]
Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato]
Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Movement is transmitted through everything, and it must have started with self-generated motion [Plato]
If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato]
If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Even the gods love play [Plato]
Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato]
The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
If Plato's God is immaterial, he will lack consciousness, wisdom, pleasure and movement, which are essential to him [Cicero on Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato]
Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
In 'The Laws', to obey the law is to be obey god [Plato, by MacIntyre]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The only possible beginning for the endless motions of reality is something self-generated [Plato]
Self-moving soul has to be the oldest thing there is [Plato]
Self-generating motion is clearly superior to all other kinds of motion [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Soul must be the cause of all the opposites, such as good and evil or beauty and ugliness [Plato]
If all the motions of nature reflect calculations of reason, then the best kind of soul must direct it [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
If the gods are non-existent or indifferent, why bother to deceive them? [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato]
If astronomical movements are seen as necessary instead of by divine will, this leads to atheism [Plato]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
The heavens must be full of gods, controlling nature either externally or from within [Plato]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
There must be at least two souls controlling the cosmos, one doing good, the other the opposite [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato]
Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Something is unlikely to be immortal if it is imperfectly made from diverse parts [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Is the supreme reward for virtue to be drunk for eternity? [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
God is responsible for the good things, but we must look elsewhere for the cause of the bad things [Plato]