67 ideas
| 10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
| 10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
| 10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
| 21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
| 21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
| 21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
| 21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
| 8983 | If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury] |
| 8986 | We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury] |
| 8982 | Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury] |
| 8984 | If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury] |
| 8985 | Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury] |
| 5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross] |
| 5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross] |
| 5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
| 5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
| 5506 | If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus] |
| 21827 | The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus] |
| 21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
| 21809 | Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus] |
| 21825 | The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus] |
| 5924 | Identical objects must have identical value [Ross] |
| 10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
| 10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
| 5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross] |
| 5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross] |
| 5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
| 5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
| 21826 | The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus] |
| 7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
| 5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
| 5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
| 5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
| 5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
| 5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
| 5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
| 5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
| 5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
| 5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
| 5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
| 5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
| 5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
| 5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
| 5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
| 5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
| 5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
| 5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
| 6922 | Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach] |
| 5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
| 5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
| 5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross] |
| 18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross] |
| 5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross] |
| 5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross] |
| 5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross] |
| 5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG] |
| 5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross] |
| 5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross] |
| 5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross] |
| 5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross] |
| 5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross] |
| 10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |
| 21815 | Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus] |
| 21816 | Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus] |
| 21814 | How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus] |
| 21808 | Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus] |
| 21811 | Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus] |