62 ideas
10468 | A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver] |
10471 | Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver] |
10749 | Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
10750 | Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith] |
21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith] |
9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith] |
9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith] |
9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith] |
9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith] |
9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith] |
9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith] |
9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith] |
9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith] |
9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith] |
9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith] |
9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith] |
9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith] |
10747 | Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver] |
10748 | Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver] |
10721 | If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver] |
10719 | There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver] |
10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver] |
10720 | We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver] |
10714 | The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver] |
10715 | There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver] |
10739 | The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver] |
10738 | Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver] |
10740 | The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver] |
10741 | Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver] |
10742 | Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver] |
10472 | 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver] |
10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
10722 | Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver] |
10744 | Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver] |
10726 | Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver] |
10725 | Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver] |
9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith] |
9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith] |
9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith] |
10745 | Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver] |
5506 | If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus] |
21827 | The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus] |
21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
21809 | Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus] |
21825 | The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus] |
10746 | Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver] |
21826 | The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus] |
6922 | Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach] |
21814 | How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus] |
21815 | Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus] |
21816 | Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus] |
21808 | Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus] |
21811 | Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus] |