90 ideas
14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
5506 | If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus] |
8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
21827 | The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus] |
14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
21809 | Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus] |
21825 | The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus] |
8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
21826 | The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus] |
6922 | Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach] |
21814 | How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus] |
21815 | Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus] |
21816 | Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus] |
14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |
14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |
21808 | Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus] |
21811 | Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus] |