Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Plutarch, Anaximenes and Stephen Yablo

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50 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo]
Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo]
Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo]
'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo]
We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Replacing timbers on Theseus' ship was the classic illustration of the problem of growth and change [Plutarch]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The sun is always bright; it doesn't become bright when it emerges [Plutarch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo]
Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Some philosophers say the soul is light [Plutarch]
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Some say emotion is a sort of reason, and others say virtue concerns emotion [Plutarch]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Being manly and brave is the result of convention, not of human nature [Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Animals don't value pleasure, as they cease sexual intercourse after impregnation [Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Animals have not been led into homosexuality, because they value pleasure very little [Plutarch]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
For Anaximenes nature is air, which takes different forms by rarefaction and condensation [Anaximenes, by Simplicius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
People report seeing through rocks, or over the horizon, or impossibly small works [Plutarch]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Absurd superstitions make people atheist, not disharmony in nature [Plutarch]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch]