Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Proclus, Charlotte Witt and Alexander Nehamas

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13 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas]
A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Reality is directional [Witt]