169 ideas
18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
13165 | Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus] |
3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
9569 | The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus] |
3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |
3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |