16 ideas
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
13165 | Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
9569 | The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus] |