16 ideas
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
13536 | Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
13165 | Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus] |
9569 | The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |