21 ideas
23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
16186 | The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen] |
16187 | The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen] |
16190 | BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen] |
19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |
8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee] |
8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee] |
8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee] |