Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for R Feldman / E Conee, Cheryl Misak and Ori Simchen

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
23277 Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19108 Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]
19094 For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
19105 Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
19100 Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
19099 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
19103 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
19101 Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
19096 Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
19106 Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19098 Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
19104 Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
16186 The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen]
16187 The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen]
16190 BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
19109 The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16188 Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
8808 Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
8807 Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee]
8809 Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8810 If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee]