Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for R Martin / J Barresi, Iris Murdoch and Ruth Barcan Marcus

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
We know perfection when we see what is imperfect [Murdoch]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
We should first decide what are the great works of art, with aesthetic theory following from that [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Great art proves the absurdity of art for art's sake [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Because art is love, it improves us morally [Murdoch]
Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch]
Art and morals are essentially the same, and are both identical with love [Murdoch]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch]
Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch]
Love is realising something other than oneself is real [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch]
It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch]
Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Man is a brave naked will, separate from a background of values and realities [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch]
Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]