Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for R Martin / J Barresi, Thomas S. Kuhn and Penelope Mackie

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31 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
12129 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
18076 Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher]
22191 Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
6809 Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
22183 Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
6162 Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]
22184 Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha]
7619 Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn]
12128 In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
5504 Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
5503 Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
5502 Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
5505 For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]