16 ideas
| 12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
| 19702 | We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty] |
| 19701 | Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty] |
| 19700 | It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty] |
| 18076 | Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher] |
| 22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham] |
| 6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
| 22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn] |
| 6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
| 22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
| 7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
| 12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
| 5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
| 5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
| 5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
| 5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |