Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Ralph Cudworth, Dorothy Edgington and Mengzi (Mencius)

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47 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
If the King likes music then there is hope for the state [Mengzi (Mencius)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human nature is naturally compassionate and good (as a 'sprout'), but people may not be good [Mengzi (Mencius), by Norden]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Righteousness is extending the unthinkable, to reveal what must be done [Mengzi (Mencius)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Each correct feeling relies on an underlying virtue [Mengzi (Mencius)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Should a coward who ran fifty paces from a battle laugh at another who ran a hundred? [Mengzi (Mencius)]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
There is a self-determing power in each person, which makes them what they are [Cudworth]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A true king shares his pleasure with the people [Mengzi (Mencius)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Extend the treatment of the old and young in your family to the rest of society [Mengzi (Mencius)]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Only put someone to death if the whole population believes it is deserved [Mengzi (Mencius)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Seeking peace through war is like looking for fish up a tree [Mengzi (Mencius)]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Avoid the animals you are going to eat, as it is hard once you have got to know them [Mengzi (Mencius)]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth]
The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth]