Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Reiss,J/Spreger,J, Albert Camus and Wesley Salmon

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens]
The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon]
Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon]
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus]
Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus]
Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science [Salmon]