Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Reiss,J/Spreger,J, Andr Gallois and Scott Sturgeon

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22353 One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
22356 An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
22359 Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
22360 The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
22362 Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
22364 Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
13437 A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
16025 If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16026 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16231 Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
16027 If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22357 The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
22365 The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
2534 Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon]
2537 Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
2532 Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
2533 Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
2535 The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
2536 Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon]