85 ideas
3348 | If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl] |
15570 | Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt] |
7614 | Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam] |
6893 | Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner] |
22216 | Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
21217 | Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl] |
22218 | There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22217 | Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22219 | Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22204 | Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl] |
22207 | Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl] |
22208 | 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl] |
22210 | After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl] |
22215 | Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl] |
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
9641 | Definitions should be replaceable by primitives, and should not be creative [Brown,JR] |
22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
9634 | Set theory says that natural numbers are an actual infinity (to accommodate their powerset) [Brown,JR] |
9613 | Naïve set theory assumed that there is a set for every condition [Brown,JR] |
9615 | Nowadays conditions are only defined on existing sets [Brown,JR] |
9617 | The 'iterative' view says sets start with the empty set and build up [Brown,JR] |
9642 | A flock of birds is not a set, because a set cannot go anywhere [Brown,JR] |
21222 | Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
21223 | Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
9605 | If a proposition is false, then its negation is true [Brown,JR] |
9649 | Axioms are either self-evident, or stipulations, or fallible attempts [Brown,JR] |
9638 | Berry's Paradox finds a contradiction in the naming of huge numbers [Brown,JR] |
9604 | Mathematics is the only place where we are sure we are right [Brown,JR] |
9622 | 'There are two apples' can be expressed logically, with no mention of numbers [Brown,JR] |
9837 | 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett] |
9648 | π is a 'transcendental' number, because it is not the solution of an equation [Brown,JR] |
9576 | Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl] |
17444 | Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck] |
9621 | Mathematics represents the world through structurally similar models. [Brown,JR] |
21224 | Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
9646 | There is no limit to how many ways something can be proved in mathematics [Brown,JR] |
9647 | Computers played an essential role in proving the four-colour theorem of maps [Brown,JR] |
9643 | Set theory may represent all of mathematics, without actually being mathematics [Brown,JR] |
9644 | When graphs are defined set-theoretically, that won't cover unlabelled graphs [Brown,JR] |
9625 | To see a structure in something, we must already have the idea of the structure [Brown,JR] |
9628 | Sets seem basic to mathematics, but they don't suit structuralism [Brown,JR] |
9606 | The irrationality of root-2 was achieved by intellect, not experience [Brown,JR] |
9612 | There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR] |
9610 | Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR] |
9620 | Empiricists base numbers on objects, Platonists base them on properties [Brown,JR] |
9639 | Does some mathematics depend entirely on notation? [Brown,JR] |
9629 | For nomalists there are no numbers, only numerals [Brown,JR] |
9630 | The most brilliant formalist was Hilbert [Brown,JR] |
9608 | There are no constructions for many highly desirable results in mathematics [Brown,JR] |
9645 | Constructivists say p has no value, if the value depends on Goldbach's Conjecture [Brown,JR] |
22209 | Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl] |
22211 | As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl] |
21226 | Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
9619 | David's 'Napoleon' is about something concrete and something abstract [Brown,JR] |
22202 | The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl] |
22213 | Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl] |
21218 | The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl] |
19263 | Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya] |
21220 | The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl] |
21216 | Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
22205 | Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl] |
21221 | Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl] |
22220 | The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22206 | Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl] |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22221 | We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet] |
21228 | Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
22212 | Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl] |
9575 | Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege] |
21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
22214 | We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl] |
21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
9611 | 'Abstract' nowadays means outside space and time, not concrete, not physical [Brown,JR] |
9609 | The older sense of 'abstract' is where 'redness' or 'group' is abstracted from particulars [Brown,JR] |
9819 | Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl] |
9851 | Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl] |
9640 | A term can have not only a sense and a reference, but also a 'computational role' [Brown,JR] |
22203 | Only facts follow from facts [Husserl] |
9635 | Given atomism at one end, and a finite universe at the other, there are no physical infinities [Brown,JR] |