126 ideas
9408 | Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford] |
24069 | Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki] |
9429 | Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford] |
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
9427 | For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
9435 | A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford] |
9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
24065 | Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki] |
18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
24066 | The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki] |
14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
24067 | Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
18618 | Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford] |
18619 | Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford] |
18620 | Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford] |
14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
19068 | Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford] |
9430 | Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford] |
9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
9443 | It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford] |
14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
9444 | There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford] |
14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
9441 | Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford] |
14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
9431 | Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford] |
9416 | Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford] |
9415 | Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford] |
9422 | If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford] |
9421 | The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford] |
9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
9434 | Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford] |
14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
9437 | To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford] |
9439 | The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford] |
9412 | You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford] |
13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |
9411 | There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford] |